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Abstract Intrusion detection has become a challenging task
with the rapid growth in numbers of computer users. The
present-day technology requires an efficient method to detect
intrusion in the computer network system. Intrusion detec-
tion system is a classifier which collects evidences for the
presence of intrusion and raises an alarm for any abnormali-
ties present. However, the use of intrusion detection system
encounters two major drawbacks: higher false alarm rate
and lower detection rate; these limit the detection perfor-
mance of intrusion detection system. A prospective approach
for improving performance is through the use of multi-
ple sensors/intrusion detection system. Evidence theory is
a mathematical theory of evidence which is used to fuse
evidences from multiple sources of evidence and outputs a
global decision. The work in this paper discusses the limita-
tions and issueswith evidence theory andproposes amodified
framework for fusion of alarms of multiple intrusion detec-
tion systems.
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Introduction
The technological advancement in computer network system
and its related infrastructure is the reason for an increased
occurrence rate of computer intrusions. An intrusion is
defined as any set of actions to violate the security protocol of
a computer network system [8]. Intrusion detection system is
a classifier which collects evidences for the presence of intru-
sion and raises an alarm for any abnormalities present [7].
There is tremendous research going on to improve the effi-
ciency of an intrusion detection system. The major research
in [2,4,9,12] shows that intrusion detection system encoun-
ters two major drawbacks: higher false alarm rate and lower
detection rate. A prospective approach to improve the detec-
tion rate and to reduce the false alarm rate is through the use
of distributed IDS systems.
The distributed IDS systems consist of multiple intrusion
detection systems which are dissimilar in nature. The dis-
similarity is by the fact that they extract different features
of network traffic or might have completely different detec-
tion algorithms, viz., signature-based IDS or anomaly-based
IDS [6]. Authors in [14] present the alert fusion process
and show that when anomaly detection techniques and sig-
nature recognition techniques are applied simultaneously
to the same observed activities of computer and network
systems, anomaly detection techniques and signature recog-
nition techniques complement one another for achieving a
high detection rate and a low false alarm rate. However, along
with the potential benefits of distributed IDS system, decid-
ing an efficient fusion rule to combine evidences fromdiverse
IDS systems is still a loophole. Also, there is a concern on
finding the reliability value of an IDS. The work in this paper
proposes a new fusion rule that incorporates reliability of evi-
dence and also efficiently handles the information for diverse
IDS.
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Evidence theory
Evidence theory is a mathematical theory used to combine
the evidence from multiple sources of information to calcu-
late the probability of an event. The Dempster–Shafer theory
proposed by Arthur Dempster and modified by Glenn Shafer
in [11] is the first mathematical theory proposed to combine
uncertain information of sources to make an inference. The
fusion rule proposed under Dempster–Shafer framework is
called as Dempster–Shafer rule. Dempster–Shafer rule has
been a topic of debate for researchers working in the field of
information fusion.
The fusion theory is used to combine masses from n evi-
dence sources and outputs a fused decision. For number of
evidence sources n ≥ 2, let Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, . . . , θn} be the
frame of discernment for the fusion problem under consid-
eration having n exclusive and exhaustive hypothesis. The
sets of all subsets of Θ is called as power-set of Θ and is
denoted by 2Θ . In Shafer’s framework [11], the basic belief
assignment (bba) is a function m from 2Θ , the power set of
Θ to [0, 1]. The mass assignment will satisfy the property
m(φ) = 0 and
∑
A∈2Θ
m(A) = 1 (1)
Let m1(B) and m2(C) be two independent masses from two
sources of evidence; then the combined mass m(A) obtained










m(φ) = 0 (3)
Reliability of intrusion detection system
The purpose of designing a fusion-based distributed intru-
sion detection system is to detect intrusion which was rather
not detected by single IDS system. The success of fusion
depends upon the accuracy of evidence provided by the indi-
vidual IDS.Majority of fusion rules proposed in the literature
along with DS rule assume all evidences to be equally reli-
able and assign the sameweightage during the fusion process.
However, it is often the case that some IDS are completely
reliable, while others are completely unreliable for a partic-
ular frame of discernment. Reliability of IDS is defined as
the level of trust about the evidence provided by the IDS for
the presence of an intrusion [10]. Reliability indicates the
relative stability of IDS whose value lies between 0 and 1
[10].
Within the framework of distributed IDS, the evidence
provided by IDS with zero reliability should be completely
ignored and the evidence provided by IDS with higher reli-
ability should be given more weightage. This calls for a
fusion rule that effectively handles the reliability of each
evidence while making the decision. However, one major
concern in incorporating reliability of IDS into the fusion rule
is the problem of obtaining reliability values. The problem
of finding reliability can be related to the problem of conflict
between various intrusion detection systems. The mere exis-
tence of conflict between the evidences provided by intrusion
detection systems indicates the presence of an unreliable IDS
which may cause the fusion result to be complementary from
reality.
Another approach for finding reliability is to relate relia-
bility with the true alert rate of IDS. In this approach, it is
assumed that the IDS having highest true alert rate and low-
est false alert rate will be assigned highest reliability and,
thereby, given highest weightage in fusion process, while all
other IDS is assigned relative reliability value based on their
true alert rate and false alert rate. The approach of assigning
reliability based on true alert rate requires the ground truth
knowledge.While the approach of assigning reliability based
on conflict between the IDS can work without the knowledge
of ground truth.
Alert fusion method
A distributed IDS is a framework where multiple hetero-
geneous IDS systems are deployed to sniff the incoming
network traffic. Each IDS while sniffing the incoming net-
work traffic raises an alert for the presence of an attack. The
alerts can be positive alerts or negative alerts. Positive alerts
are the alerts favouring the occurrence of an intrusion/attack
and negative alerts are alerts opposing the presence of an
intrusion/attack. The alerts generated by IDS are converted
to a mass value. Alert-to-mass conversion is done using the
formula proposed by Jøsang [5]. If we denote the hypothesis
that attack is present by H and attack not present by −H ,
then, according to [5], we have,
m(H) = P
P + N + C (4)
m(−H) = N
P + N + C (5)
m(H or − H) = C
P + N + C (6)
where P is the positive evidence in favour of hypothesis
H , N is negative evidence opposing the hypothesis H or
favouring hypothesis −H , and C is constant which is equal
to 2 for binary frame of hypothesis. m(H) is the mass value
for hypothesis H .m(H or −H) is mass value for hypothesis
H or H and can be called m(uncertain) i.e., mass value for
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uncertainty between H and −H . The converted mass is then
fused using fusion rule to make an inference.
The Dempster–Shafer rule as defined by Eq. (2) has the
following limitations:
– The Dempster–Shafer rule does not incorporate the reli-
ability of source whose evidences are to be fused. Thus,
there is no real-time criteria which assign a numerical
value of reliability to the evidence given by the source.
– The Dempster–Shafer rule considered all the sources of
evidence to be equally reliable.However, in fusion frame-
work, there might be some unreliable sources which
mislead the fusion rule to give wrong decision.
– Another drawback in Dempster–Shafer rule as suggested
by Goodman [3] is that in an environment consisting
of many hypotheses and many sources, it is difficult to
decidewhether to accept or reject the result of such fusion
rule. If sources of evidences are highly conflicting, the
DS rule completely fails. If analyst blindly believes on
the result, then the decision can be misleading or com-
plementary.
To overcome the limitations of Dempster–Shafer rule,
we propose a new fusion rule which is the modification of






























Here, Rn is the reliability value of nth source of evidence.
CRF(A) is conjunctive reliability value about A, andDRF(A)
is disjunctive reliability value about A.CRF and DRF values
act as weighting factors to compromise between conjunctive
mass and disjunctive mass. The complete flow diagram of
the proposed alert fusion method is as shown in Fig. 1.
Experimental setup
For alert fusion of multiple intrusion detection systems, four
heterogeneous intrusion detection systems namely, Snort,
Fig. 1 Flowchart of the
proposed fusion approach
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Suricata, packet header anomaly detector (PHAD) and net-
work anomaly detector (NETAD) have been selected. The
reason behind such selection is that snort and suricata
are signature-based intrusion detectors, while PHAD and
NETAD are anomaly detectors. Thus, both types are com-
plementary to one another which enhances the performance
of fused IDS. The simulation environment consists three
third-generation Intel Core i5 processors (1.6 GHz); Oper-
ating system installed is Linux Ubuntu with 4 GB RAM.
One machine is deployed with signature-based IDS such as
snort and suricata. Another machine is deployed with anom-
aly detectors such as PHAD and NETAD. Third machine
acts as an attacker machine having KDD99 Dataset. The
packets of the dataset are being replayed with TCPREPLAY
tool [13].
KDD99 dataset
KDD is the abbreviation of knowledge discovery in data-
bases. KDD refers to the overall process of recovering
knowledge from data. Specifically, KDD99 is designed for
evaluation of intrusion in computer networks [1]. It is like
a benchmark on which many researchers have tested their
methodologies. The dataset is available in tcpdump format.
The original tcpdump files were preprocessed for utilization
of intrusion detection benchmark. KDD99 dataset consists
of 4,900,000 single connection vectors, each of which con-
tains 41 features and is labeled as either normal or an attack.
The attack falls in one of the types and subtypes shown in
Table 1. The list of 41 features of dataset is shown in appen-
Table 1 Types of attack categories in KDD99 dataset
Attack type Sub attack types
DOS Smurf, teardrop, pod, back, land, apache2, udpstrom,
mailbomb, processtable, Neptune
Probe Ipsweep, portsweep, nmap, satan, saint, mscan
U2R Bufferoverflow, rootkit, perl, loadmodule
R2L Imap, ftpwrite, guesspasswd, multihop, phf, spy,
warezclient, warezmaster
Fig. 2 Comparison of individual IDS with fusion with DS and fusion
with proposed rule in terms of TP, TN, FN and FP with conflict as a
reliability parameter
Fig. 3 Comparison of TPR and FPR values for proposed rule with DS
rule
dix as Table 4. The KDD99 was preprocessed, and then, total
3456 packets containing attack and non-attacks packets in
various types were loaded on the network and are replayed
using TCPREPLAY [13].
Results
The evaluation of proposed rule against KDD99 [1] is done
by considering two different approaches of reliability. The
experiment focuses on detection of smurf attack. Hence, the
frame of discernment isΘ = {smurf,−smurf, θ}. InKDD99
Table 2 Comparison of individual IDS with fusion with DS and fusion with proposed rule in terms of PPV, NPV, TPR, FPR and ACCURACY
with conflict as a reliability parameter
Snort Suricata PHAD NETAD Fusion with DS rule Fusion with proposed rule
TPR 0.5129 0.4974 0.5221 0.4938 0.5185 0.5314
FPR 0.5093 0.5099 0.5172 0.4987 0.5218 0.0073
PPV 0.5642 0.5564 0.5648 0.5601 0.5609 0.9895
NPV 0.4393 0.4313 0.4400 0.4351 0.4358 0.6223
ACCURACY 0.5032 0.4942 0.5049 0.4971 0.5009 0.7332
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Table 3 Comparison of individual IDS with fusion with DS and fusion with proposed rule in terms of PPV, NPV, TPR, FPR and ACCURACY
with true positive rate as a reliability parameter
Snort Suricata PHAD NETAD Fusion with DS rule Fusion with proposed rule
TPR 0.4712 0.5221 0.5051 0.4681 0.4985 0.5216
FPR 0.4788 0.4954 0.4914 0.4960 0.4940 0.0146
PPV 0.5545 0.5754 0.5693 0.5482 0.5647 0.9788
NPV 0.4339 0.4509 0.4443 0.4243 0.4397 0.6160
ACCURACY 0.4931 0.5145 0.5067 0.4838 0.5017 0.7248
Fig. 4 Comparison of individual IDS with fusion with DS and fusion
with proposed rule in terms of TP, TN, FN and FP with true positive
rate as a reliability parameter
Fig. 5 Comparison of TPR and FPR values for proposed rule with DS
rule
dataset [1], total 1944 smurf attack is present. Table 2 shows
the results of true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate
(FPR), positive prediction value (PPV) and negative predic-
tion value (NPV) of Snort, Suricata,NETADandPHADas an
individual IDS. Table 2 also shows the result of alert fusion of
Snort, Suricata, NETAD and PHAD using Dempster–Shafer
rule and the proposed rule. The results of fusion are derived
by considering conflict between IDS evidence as a reliability
factor. It can be observed from Fig. 2 that with alert fusion
using proposed rule, the number of true negatives are higher
compared to individual IDS, while there is a drastic reduc-
tion in the number of false positives. Figure 3 shows that
the alert fusion with proposed rule drastically reduces the
false positive rate (FPR) without affecting the true positive
rate.
Table 3 shows the results of true positive rate (TPR), false
positive rate (FPR), positive prediction value (PPV) and neg-
ative prediction value (NPV) of Snort, Suricata, NETAD and
PHAD as an individual IDS. Table 3 also shows the result
of alert fusion of Snort, Suricata, NETAD and PHAD using
Dempster–Shafer rule and the proposed rule. The results of
fusion are derived by considering true positive rate of an IDS
as a reliability factor. Figures 4 and 5 show the comparison
of individual IDS systems with fusion using DS and fusion
using proposed rule in terms of true positives, true negatives,
false negatives and false positives and FPR and TPR, respec-
tively.
Conclusion
Distributed alert fusion can be achieved with Dempster–
Shafer rule. The proposed alert fusion system described here
improves the performance of detection by reducing the ad
hoc created by high amount of false alerts. The reduction in
false alerts is achieved by the fact that the DS rule assumes
all evidence sources to be equally reliable, while the pro-
posed rule incorporates variable reliability of IDS measured
either from conflict between IDS or from true positive rate
of IDS.
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Table 4 KDD’99 features list
Feature number Feature name Description
1 Count No. of connections to the same host as the
current connection in the last 2 s
2 Destination bytes Bytes sent from destination to source
3 diff srv rate Percentage of connections to different services
4 dst host count Count of connections having the same
destination hosts
5 dst host diff srv rate Percentage of different services on the current
host
6 dst host rerror rate Percentage of connections to the current host that
have an RST error
7 dst host same src port rate Percentage of connections to the current host
having the same src port
8 dst host same srv rate Percentage of connections having the same
destination host and using the same service
9 dst host serror rate Percentage of connections to the current host that
have an S0 error
10 dst host srv count Count of connections having the same
destination host and using the same service
11 dst host srv diff host rate Percentage of connections to the same service
coming from different hosts
12 dst host srv rerror rate Percentage of connections to the current host and
specified service that have an RST error
13 dst host srv serror rate Percentage of connections to the current host and
specified service that have an S0 error
14 Duration Duration of the active connection
15 Flag status Flag of the connection
16 Hot No. of “hot” indicators
17 Is guest login 1 if the login is a “guest” login; otherwise 0
18 Is host login 1 if the login belongs to the “host”; otherwise 0
19 Land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port;
otherwise 0
20 Logged in 1 if successfully logged in; otherwise 0
21 Num access files No. of operations on access control files
22 Num compromised No. of compromised conditions
23 Num failed logins No. of failed logins
24 Num file creations No. of file creation operations
25 Num outbound cmds No. of outbound commands in an ftp session
26 Num root No. of “root” accesses
27 Num shells No. of shell prompts
28 Protocol type Connection protocol (e.g. tcp, udp)
29 rerror rate Percentage of connections that have “REJ” errors
30 Root shell 1 if root shell is obtained; otherwise 0
31 Same srv rate Percentage of connections to the same service
32 serror rate Percentage of connections that have “SYN”
errors
33 Service Destination service (e.g. telnet, ftp)
34 src bytes Bytes sent from source to destination
35 srv count No. of connections to the same service as the
current connection in the last 2 s
36 srv diff host rate Percentage of connections to different hosts
37 srv rerror rate Percentage of connections that have “REJ” errors
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Table 4 continued
Feature number Feature name Description
38 srv serror rate Percentage of connections that have “SYN”
errors
39 su attempted 1 if “su root” command attempted; otherwise 0
40 Urgent No. of urgent packets
41 Wrong fragment No. of wrong fragments
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